मनमोहन सिंहले माधव नेपाललाई झपारेछन्

By Salokya, on March 15th, 2011

विकिलिक्सले सार्वजनिक गरेको यो अर्को दस्तावेजमा भेटिएका रोचक र गोप्य कुराहरु-

भारतीय प्रधानमन्त्री मनमोहन सिंहले एमाले नेता माधवकुमार नेपाललाई माओवादीबाट टाढा रहन र तत्कालीन प्रधानमन्त्री गिरिजाप्रसाद कोइरालासित काम गर्न झपारेका रहेछन्।

भारतीय विदेशमन्त्री प्रणव मुखर्जीले माधव नेपाललाई माओवादी सेनालाई कुनै पनि हालतमा नेपाली सेनामा समायोजन नगर्नु है भनी कडा शब्दमा थर्काएछन्।

कृष्णप्रसाद सिटौला गृहमन्त्रीका रुपमा रहिरहने भनी मुखर्जीले भनेछन्। (नेपालको गृहमन्त्री को हुने को नहुने भन्ने पनि भारतीय विदेशमन्त्रीले निर्णय गर्नुपर्ने ?)

प्रचण्डले भेट्नु पर्‍यो भनी पठाएको सन्देशलाई नयाँ दिल्लीले अस्वीकार गरेका रहेछन्।


केबल पुरा हेर्नुस्-

112456 6/18/2007 13:21 07KATHMANDU1197 Embassy Kathmandu SECRET//NOFORN 07KATHMANDU1112|07KATHMANDU1197 “VZCZCXRO8272OO RUEHCIDE RUEHKT #1197/01 1691321ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 181321Z JUN 07FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDUTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6311INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5863RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 6169RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1399RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4194RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5468RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1610RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 3602RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYRUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2784RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITYRHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITYRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY” “S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001197

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, KDEM, MARR, IN, NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: INDIAN OFFICIALS TAKE TOUGHER STAND ON MAOISTS

REF: KATHMANDU 1112

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

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1. (C) On June 15, Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee confirmed to the Ambassador that the Government of India had taken a tougher line on Maoist abuses. Mukherjee’s recent visit to New Delhi had coincided with the visit of Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal. According to Mukherjee, who sat in on a June 6 meeting between Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee and MK Nepal, the Foreign Minister had expressed concern that the law and order situation in Nepal continued to deteriorate and Maoist abuses had gone unpunished. Moreover, Foreign Minister Mukherjee had been categorical in his discussion with MK Nepal that the Maoists should not be integrated into the Nepal Army. Ambassador Mukherjee asserted that the GOI would not tolerate continued attempts by the Maoist splinter Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (“”People’s Terai Liberation Front”") (JTMM) to derail the Constituent Assembly election. He agreed that the Maoists had not showed a true commitment to joining the political mainstream.

Indian Foreign Minister Concerned About Maoist Intentions

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2. (C) Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee told the Ambassador on June 15 that senior Indian officials had voiced concern about ongoing Maoist abuses during Mukherjee’s recent consultations in New Delhi. Similarly, in a meeting between Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Kumar Mukherjee and Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) General Secretary Madav Kumar Nepal on June 6, the Foreign Minister

SIPDIS had confirmed that the leadership of the Government of India (GOI) was increasingly concerned with the deteriorating security situation in Nepal. Maoist abuses needed to be punished. Foreign Minister Mukherjee had told MK Nepal that the seven parties in the governing coalition needed to stay united and take clear steps to prepare for free and fair elections in November. This was the only way, FM Mukherjee had opined, to keep the Maoists in the political process. The Foreign Minister had also made it clear to MK Nepal that the GON should not – under any circumstances – integrate Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army.

Home Minister Will Stay On

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3. (C) Foreign Minister Mukherjee had hinted to MK Nepal during their meeting, according to Ambassador Mukherjee, that Home Minister Sitaula needed to do more to address the country’s security situation. The Indian Ambassador speculated that Sitaula had dodged a bullet because the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (MPRF) had retracted its demand for his resignation. Mukherjee acknowledged to the Ambassador that Sitaula was a big part of the problem; unfortunately, he noted, Sitaula would probably stay on as Home Minister.

JTMM Activity Won’t Be Tolerated

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4. (C) Mukherjee agreed with the Ambassador that the Government of Nepal had to take concrete steps to include marginalized groups in the political process. He also noted that the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (“”People’s Terai Liberation Front”") (JTMM) should be brought into discussions and convinced to declare a “”revolutionary cease-fire”" to save face. Mukherjee told the Ambassador that the GOI would do “”everything in its power”" to address the situation if the JTMM tried to derail the Constituent Assembly election. Mukherjee felt that Maoist acts of violence would be the single most destabilizing factor leading up to the election. He asserted that the U.S. should stand firm in its decision

KATHMANDU 00001197 002 OF 002

not to communicate with the Maoists, as doing so would only reward bad behavior.

Maoists Not Invited to New Delhi

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5. (S/NF) When asked by the Ambassador whether the Maoists had been invited back to New Delhi for consultations, Ambassador Mukherjee said that officials in New Delhi had refused the informal requests for a visit they had received from Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka Prachanda). According to Mukherjee, Dahal’s go-betweens were told by the Indian Embassy that it was not the time for a visit to New Delhi because the Maoists had continued to break their commitments to the peace process. The Maoists had reportedly lamented the fact that they had “”lost their former channels”" of communication to New Delhi. In response, GOI officials had made it clear that, since the Maoists had entered into the Interim Government, the intelligence community was no longer their conduit. “”We are the conduit now,”" Ambassador Mukherjee noted, referring to his embassy.

Comment

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6. (C) The Indian Ambassador continues privately to express much more pessimism about Maoist actions and intentions than in the past (reftel). Mukherjee shared our analysis that the Maoists continue to seek total state power — even if he is not prepared to say so publicly. Foreign Minister Mukherjee’s recent push for CPN-UML leader MK Nepal to maintain seven-party unity and enforce law and order was useful and timely. According to the Indian political counselor, Prime Minister Monmohan Singh was even blunter with MK Nepal, warning him to be wary of the Maoists and urging him to work with Prime Minister Koirala. We hope that a two-pronged message from India and the U.S. could help push the GON to address the current security situation and move quickly toward a November Constituent Assembly election while maintaining guard against Maoist machinations.

MORIARTY

source:

http://www.mysansar.com/archives/2011/03/id/17722

अमेरिकाको आकलन- माओवादीको गफै ठूलो

By Salokya, on March 15th, 2011

तत्कालीन अमेरिकी राजदूत जेम्स एफ मोरियार्टीले काठमाडौँस्थित अमेरिकी दूतावासबाट पठाएको एउटा केबल विकिलिक्सले सार्वजनिक गरेको छ, जसमा शान्ति प्रक्रियामा आएपछि माओवादीलाई सरकारमा जानबाट अमेरिकाले के-के गरेको थियो भन्ने प्रष्ट भएको छ। गिरिजाप्रसाद कोइराला प्रधानमन्त्री र कृष्ण सिटौला गृहमन्त्री भएको बेलाको यो केबलमा कानुन कार्यान्वयन गर्दा शान्ति प्रक्रिया भाँडिने र वार्ताबाट माओवादी भाग्ने डर उनीहरुमा भएको उल्लेख छ। माओवादीको शक्ति आँकलन गर्दै मोरियार्टीले यस्तो अर्थ आउने शैलिमा लेखेका छन्- माओवादीको गफै ठूलो। हल्लैहल्लामा उनीहरुले यति गरेका छन्। उनीहरुसँग धेरै कम समर्थन छ अनि खुला युद्ध हुँदा सरकारी सुरक्षा फौजसँग जित्‍ने सैन्य क्षमता पनि उनीहरुसँग छैन।

अझ एक ठाउँमा उनले लेखेका छन्- यो देशको भ्रष्टाचारबाट दिक्क भएर विश्व बैँकका स्थानीय प्रतिनिधि प्रचण्डसित खाजा खाने साथी (लन्च पाल) बनेका छन्।

त्यसैगरी सशस्त्र माओवादीलाई सरकारमा जान नदिन भारतीय राजदूतले पनि आफैले जस्तो दबाब प्रधानमन्त्रीलाई दिने गरेको त्यसमा उल्लेख छ। तर भारतीय दूतले नेपाली सेना र अमेरिकी सेनाको प्रशिक्षणसम्बन्धी गतिविधिहरुलाई लिएर प्रधानमन्त्रीसमक्ष आपत्ति जनाएकोमा मोरियार्टीलाई झनक्क रिस उठेको पनि त्यसको लेखाइबाट बुझ्न सकिन्छ।

माओवादी विजयको कति नजिक भन्ने कुरा नयाँ दिल्लीलाई राम्रैसँग थाहा भएको त्यसमा उल्लेख छ। त्यसैगरी नयाँ दिल्लीले नै दलहरु र माओवादीबीच सम्बन्ध बनाउने गदफादरको काम गरेको र त्यो कामबाट राक्षस उत्पन्न हुनसक्ने कुरालाई स्वीकार गर्न नचाहेको पनि मोरियार्टीले उल्लेख गरेका छन्।

माओवादीको विजय भए यो क्षेत्रमा वामपन्थी विद्रोहलाई नयाँ उर्जा प्राप्त हुने र स्थिरतासमेत असर पर्ने भएकोले यलाई रोक्न संभव भएसम्म सबै थोक गर्नुपर्ने भन्दै मोरियार्टीले वासिङटनलाई सो केबलमा अनुरोध गरेका छन्।

केबल पूरा हेर्नुस्-

79370 9/22/2006 11:26 06KATHMANDU2587 Embassy Kathmandu SECRET//NOFORN “VZCZCXYZ0064OO RUEHWEBDE RUEHKT #2587/01 2651126ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 221126Z SEP 06FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDUTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3260INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 4805RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 5034RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 0329RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 0184RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4428RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0264RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0245RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0988RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATERHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATERUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATERHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATERUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATERUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1963″ “S E C R E T KATHMANDU 002587

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DEPT FOR S, P, AND SCA FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2016 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, IN, NP SUBJECT: CRUNCH TIME IN NEPAL?

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty, reasons 1.4 (b/d).

1. (S/NF) It looks like we’re getting to crunch time here in Nepal. The Maoists are still stringing along talks with the GON, hoping that the GON will follow up on its past four months of unilateral concessions by caving in and allowing an armed Maoist movement into an interim government. The Prime Minister assures me that he has no intention of doing that. If he does not, then the Maoists appear intent on organizing during the month of October massive public demonstrations designed to pressure the GON into putting the Maoists on the path to power. If the government still refuses to cave, the Maoists, according to a number of pretty good sources, seem ready to move in November to a campaign of urban violence, using the demonstrations as cover. Again, the goal of the violence would be to intimidate the government into handing over the keys to power.

A Tremendous Bluff?

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2. (C) The good news is that the Maoists are doing much of this through bluff. They have relatively little popular support, and they have nowhere near the military capability to take on the government’s security services in an open fight. The bad news is that the bluff may work. The Prime Minister is desperate to avoid being blamed for being the one who derailed the peace process. Just as important, the Home Minister, who also happens to be the government’s chief negotiator with the Maoists, fears that enforcement of the law against them could lead to the insurgents walking away from the negotiating table. Thus, the police are standing aside while the Maoists engage in extortion, intimidation, kidnapping, and the occasional murder — as well as preparing for their October push against the government. The government inaction is leading many Nepalis, particularly in Kathmandu, to think that a Maoist victory is inevitable.

What We Need to Do

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3. (C) Brow-beating: Ultimately, decisions made by Nepalis will determine whether this country goes down the path toward becoming a People’s Republic over the next couple of months. That said, we need to increase the possibility that the leaders here will make the right decisions. I’ve been meeting regularly with the Prime Minister, urging him (so far unsuccessfully) to use the police to enforce law and order and bucking him up to stick to his bottom line of not letting gun-toting Maoists into the government (with greater success so far). We’ve also been pushing the other major parties of the Seven Party alliance to support the Prime Minister on arms management and to push him to use the police against Maoist excesses. I’ve also created a firestorm of controversy by visiting a couple of military bases (as well as a lot of civilians) out West and publicly condemning Maoist violence. Leftist MP’s have called for my expulsion, but at least some of the people here are beginning to debate Maoist intentions.

4. (S/NF) Preparing for the worst: We need to be prepared for the possibility of a Maoist return to violence in November. The key will be to condemn as quickly as possible Maoist violence, while shipping as quickly as possible some 4,500 more weapons that we have in storage for the Nepali Army. Those weapons would have an immediate tactical impact but more importantly would shore up a government that will be under tremendous pressure to capitulate.

5. (S/NF) The Diplomatic game: The diplomacy here is getting complicated. The Europeans are all over the map with respect to recent developments. The Danes and Norwegians (who have some clout here because of their aid programs) are convinced that lasting peace is just about ready to break out and push the GON to be as accommodating as possible. The Brits, in contrast, seem convinced that the Maoists will soon be coming into power and are trying to convince themselves that that might not be so bad. The Chinese seem primarily interested in pushing Tibet issues with the weak, frequently ineffectual GON. The local World Bank rep is so fed up with the corruption in the system that he has become a frequent lunch pal of the Maoist supremo. I’m trying to push back here on some of this, but it would help if the Department could have a serious, high-level discussion with the Brits on Nepal. We might also want to look at a demarche to the Europeans and others (reminding them that the Maoists are not just agrarian reformers and seem to want power rather than peace). And finally…

Working with India

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6. (S/NF) From my perspective, we need to do more to keep the Indians in lock-step with us. I coordinate closely with my Indian counterpart here and in private he pushes the exact same message I do: that the police need to enforce law and order and that the GON should not let armed Maoists into an interim government. I was more than a little annoyed to find out, however, that the Indian Embassy had complained to the PM’s office about our training activities with the Nepal Army. (The Indian Ambassador assured me that the message had been that those exchanges should occur more quietly and had been delivered without instructions from New Delhi.) The incident underscored the fact that, while worried about current trends, New Delhi seems oblivious to how close the Maoists are getting to victory here. That makes sense: New Delhi godfathered the working relationship between the Maoists and the Parties and doesn’t want to acknowledge that it might have created a Frankenstein’s monster. Moreover, India’s Marxist party (a key supporter of the governing coalition) has proclaimed that everything here is going just fine. In that context, I hope that a discussion on Nepal will feature prominently in future conversations with senior Indian leaders.

Comment

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7. (C) The next few months will go a long way to determining whether the Maoists have any intention of coming in out of the cold, or whether there only goal is absolute power. Up until now, all signs point to the latter. I continue to fear that a Maoist assumption of power through force would lead to a humanitarian disaster in Nepal. Just as important, a Maoist victory would energize leftist insurgencies and threaten stability in the region. It thus behooves us to continue to do everything possible to block such an outcome.

MORIARTY ”

source:

http://www.mysansar.com/archives/2011/03/id/17719#more-17719